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The Minimum Distribution Rules and Their Critical
Role in Controlling the Floodgates of Qualified Plan
Wealth
Jay A. Soled and Bruce A. Wolk ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
When complete in 2009, the Three Gorges Dam at the Yangtze
River will retain trillions of gallons of water.1 The scope of this technological feat cannot be overstated. The dam will tower over 600
feet high; it will flood an area almost equal in size to half of the state
of Rhode Island; and the twenty-six turbines it houses will generate
electricity equivalent to that of eighteen nuclear power plants.2 With
the flip of a few floodgate switches, Chinese officials will have the
ability to unleash a massive flow of water, enabling them to meet
many of their country’s huge energy and aquatic needs.
In the United States, there are no dams the size of the Three
Gorges Dam. Yet, there is a vast pool, not of water, but of trillions of
dollars of wealth that is contained in tax-free qualified plans (including individual retirement accounts).3 Like the Chinese officials who
will oversee water flow at the Three Gorges Dam, Congress has the
ability to determine how and when the floodgates of this qualified
plan wealth will be released. Commonly referred to as the minimum
distribution rules, these “floodgate switches” are embodied in

∗ Jay A. Soled is a professor at Rutgers University, and Bruce A. Wolk is a professor at
the University of California, Davis.
1. See Arthur Zich, China’s Three Gorges Before the Flood, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC MAG.,
Sept. 1997, at 2.
2. See id. at 10-11.
3. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 1998 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 534 (stating that qualified plans, including assets held by state and local governments,
held $6.946 trillion at the end of 1997). Treasury officials recently reached similar estimates.
Lubick’s Summary of Administration’s Pension Reform Proposals at W&M Hearing, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Mar. 24, 1999, at 39-56.
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Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) § 401(a)(9).4 Upon certain
triggering events, these rules require plan participants or their designated beneficiaries to take distributions from their qualified plans.5
To date, Congress appears satisfied that the minimum distribution rules adequately regulate the flow of qualified plan wealth, as
evidenced by its lack of proposals to change these rules. However,
this sense of satisfaction is misplaced. The minimum distribution
rules are an administrative nightmare, and they fail to achieve their
intended goal of forcing plan participants to use their retirement assets during their and their spouses’ lifetimes. Put differently, the
floodgate switches are precariously stuck in the “off” position. While
this state of affairs may foster swelling retirement account balances, it
restricts the flow of federal tax dollars rippling into the federal coffer
to a mere trickle.
The analysis that follows is divided into four sections. Section II
sets forth the factors that make an evaluation of the minimum distribution rules timely. Section III provides an overview of the minimum distribution rules and how they regulate the flow of qualified
plan wealth. Section IV evaluates the administrability and equity of
the minimum distribution rules and whether they should be retained
in their current form. Finally, Section V offers various proposals that
would make the minimum distribution rules more effective.
II. TIMELINESS OF EVALUATION
The establishment of qualified plans by employers is a fairly recent phenomenon in the United States.6 Various tax incentives,
however, have caused their growth to flourish, making them a nearly

4. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
as amended.
5. For purposes of this analysis, the term “qualified plans” refers to the entire gamut of
tax-favored retirement plans, all of which are subject to the minimum distribution rules. These
include employer-provided qualified pension and profit-sharing plans (I.R.C. § 401), tax deferred annuities (I.R.C. § 403), unfunded deferred compensation plans of state and local governments (I.R.C. § 457), individual retirement accounts (“IRAs”) (I.R.C. § 408), and Roth
IRAs (I.R.C. § 408A).
6. For an overview of the early historic stages of private pension plans, see WILLIAM C.
GREENOUGH & FRANCIS P. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 27-47 (1976). For
an overview of the economic motivations that inspired businesses to implement private pension
plans, see STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS: THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS 18-37 (1997).
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ubiquitous feature in today’s labor market.7 These incentives include
the following privileges: employers receive an immediate income tax
deduction for contributions made on the behalf of employees to
qualified plans,8 employees are not required to declare such contributions as income until they are distributed,9 and earnings on assets
held in qualified plans may accumulate free from income tax.10 Along
with Social Security and private savings, qualified plan wealth is supposed to enable taxpayers to enjoy the same standard of living preand postemployment.11
Promoting taxpayers’ use of qualified plans through various tax
incentives comes at a price: taxpayers are able to shelter income that
would otherwise be taxed. By sanctioning the deferral of tax on trillions of dollars, Congress has lost (and continues to lose) billions of
dollars annually in potential revenue.12 In order to curtail this revenue loss and to ensure that qualified plan wealth is used on behalf of
plan participants (and their spouses), Congress instituted the minimum distribution rules.13 At first, these rules applied only to a small
number of qualified plans, namely those established by the self-

7. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
LAW 25-29 (2000) (outlining the characteristics of those employees who participate in qualified plans).
8. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(1)-(3). In the case of traditional IRAs, there is no employer deduction, but the contribution is directly deductible by the employee. See id. § 219.
9. See id. §§ 402-403.
10. See id. §§ 408(e)(1), 501(a). As in the case with exempt organizations, qualified
plans are taxed on “unrelated business income,” which is essentially the income from any trade
or business regularly carried on by the trust or by a partnership of which it is a member. See id.
§§ 511-513(b).
11. See Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 855 (1987) (“Thus, while there are no doubt disagreements at
the margin, replacement of some significant portion of preretirement wages must be the fundamental goal of retirement security policy.”). A series of other law reviews express similar
views. See Nancy Altman, Rethinking Retirement Income Policies: Nondiscrimination, Integration and the Quest for Worker Security, 42 TAX L. REV. 433 (1987); Michael A. Oberst, A Perspective of the Qualified Plan Tax Subsidy, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 603 (1983); Bruce A. Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality,
70 VA. L. REV. 419 (1984).
12. See Robert L. Clark & Elisa Wolper, Pension Tax Expenditures: Magnitude, Distribution, and Economic Effects, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD PENSIONS 41-84 (Sylvester J. Schieber
& John B. Shoven eds., 1997) (pointing out that revenue losses attributable to pension plan
provisions constitute the single largest tax expenditure in the federal budget); see infra Table I
and accompanying text (detailing the magnitude of the tax expenditure).
13. See § 401(a)(9).
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employed.14 Eventually, however, Congress expanded their coverage
to apply to virtually all qualified plans.15 Upon the passage of time or
the occurrence of certain events, these rules require that plan participants remove wealth from the tax-free sanctuary of their qualified
plans.16
Until recently, the minimum distribution rules played a marginal
role in dictating the outflow of wealth from qualified plans. This was
largely due to the fact that most employers traditionally established
defined benefit plans.17 Under the terms of these plans, a participant
is promised a specific benefit upon retirement, which is determined
under a formula contained in the plan.18 Once determined, the benefit is ordinarily distributed in the form of a single life annuity (or
joint annuity, in the case of married participants).19 This type of distribution obviates the need for minimum distribution rules since
such payments are automatically spread evenly over the life of the
participant and the participant’s spouse and cease upon their death.
Defined benefit plan distributions are rarely made to persons other
than plan participants and their spouses.20

14. See Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-792, §
2, 76 Stat. 809, 809 (1962). Even prior to the introduction of the minimum distribution rules,
the Internal Revenue Service (“Service”) took the position that plan participants’ efforts to
provide death benefits would violate the exclusive benefit rule. The exclusive benefit rule requires that qualified plans primarily benefit employees rather than their designated beneficiaries. See Rev. Rul. 56-656, 1956-2 C.B. 280 (stating that an arrangement does not qualify under I.R.C. § 401(a) if the benefits it provides are not payable to an employee but only to his
beneficiary upon his death); Rev. Rul. 74-360, 1974-2 C.B. 130 (holding that because the
participant’s beneficiary or beneficiaries may receive concurrent payments from the plan prior
to the death of the plan participant, the profit-sharing plan fails to qualify under I.R.C. §
401(a)).
15. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §
310(b)(1), 96 Stat. 324, 327 (1982).
16. See infra Section III.
17. See SASS, supra note 6, at 147-78; Olivia S. Mitchell & Sylvester J. Schieber, Defined
Contribution Pensions: New Opportunities, New Risks, in LIVING WITH DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS: REMAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR RETIREMENT 1-15 (Olivia S.
Mitchell & Sylvester J. Schieber eds., 1998) [hereinafter DEFINED CONTRIBUTION
PENSIONS].
18. The amount of this benefit is usually based upon a formula that takes into account
factors such as the participant’s age, years of service, and salary. For a general description of
defined benefit plan dynamics, see MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND OTHER
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS ¶¶ 3.51-.59 (1997).
19. See RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSIONS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 103-05
(1986).
20. This is because (i) spousal consent is required to name a designated beneficiary other
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But the minimum distribution rules have now begun to play a
pivotal role in dictating the flow (or trickle) of wealth out of qualified plans. This is because over the last two decades the retirement
planning environment has undergone dramatic changes. The nature
of these changes and their implications are discussed in the subsections that follow.
A. Popularity of Defined Contribution Plans
Over the past two decades, defined contribution plans (including
IRAs) have evolved to be the qualified plan of choice, eclipsing the
once dominant role of defined benefit plans.21 In general, a defined
contribution plan is a qualified plan in which the plan participant is
not guaranteed a predetermined benefit upon retirement but instead
has an individual account that houses his or her retirement wealth.22
Several factors have led to the preference for defined contribution
plans over defined benefit plans.
First, over the past three decades, major legislative changes have
made defined benefit plans more difficult and expensive to maintain.
With the intention of overhauling the private retirement planning
system, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (“ERISA”) in 1974.23 Among other things, this legislation imposed strict minimum funding requirements on defined benefit
plans.24 To comply with the minimum funding requirements, employers with defined benefit plans must retain the services of an actuary who must annually monitor current and projected plan assets and
liabilities. ERISA also established the Pension Benefit Guarantee
Corporation (“PBGC”) to monitor plan solvency and insure the

than the spouse, see I.R.C. § 401(a)(11), and (ii) upon the death of the plan participant, under
the terms of most defined benefit plans the surviving spouse cannot name a new designated
beneficiary.
21. See ANGELA CHANG, EXPLANATIONS FOR THE TREND AWAY FROM DEFINED
BENEFIT PENSION PLANS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS
(1991); KELLY OLSEN & JACK VANDERHIE, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
SPECIAL REPORT SR-33/EBRI ISSUE BRIEF NO. 190, DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN
DOMINANCE GROWS ACROSS SECTORS AND EMPLOYER SIZES, WHILE MEGA DEFINED PLANS
REMAIN STRONG (1997).
22. For a general description of defined contribution plan dynamics, see CANAN, supra
note 18, at ¶¶ 3.11-.19.
23. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
24. See I.R.C. § 412.
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payment of promised benefits.25 Employers who sponsor defined
benefit plans must pay insurance premiums to the PBGC26 so that
the PBGC can meet the financial obligations of retirement plans that
become insolvent.27 Furthermore, ERISA makes plan sponsors liable
for any shortfall in defined benefit plan assets when plans become insolvent.28 Thus, the employer using defined benefit plans bears a
downside investment risk. In contrast, under a defined contribution
plan, the employee bears all of the investment risk. In addition to
ERISA, other legislative measures have placed additional administrative burdens on the maintenance of defined benefit plans.29 As a consequence, defined benefit plans have less potential appeal to employers.30
Second, in addition to being less costly, less risky, and less administratively burdensome to employers, defined contribution plans
offer plan participants more flexibility and independence.31 More
specifically, defined contribution plans often enable employees to
make investment choices geared towards their own risk tolerance and

25. See ERISA §§ 4002-4003.
26. See id. § 4006(a)(3).
27. See id. § 4022(a) (the PBGC “shall guarantee [the] payment of all nonforfeitable
benefits [under] a single employer plan”).
28. See id. § 4062.
29. For an overview of these legislative changes, see Edwin C. Hustead, Trends in Retirement Income Plan Administrative Expenses, in DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS, supra
note 17, at 167-70. In addition, Hustead comments that “[t]he cost of administering retirement plans has continuously increased since the enactment of ERISA in 1974. This is particularly true for defined benefit plans.” Id. at 175-76.
30. Even many of those employers who have been maintaining defined benefit plans
have been replacing them with a special form of such plans known as a cash balance pension
plan. See, e.g., Lee Sheppard, Pension Downsizing, Continued, 83 TAX NOTES 1107 (1999)
(discussing the use of cash balance plans as a mechanism to avoid penalties associated with a
pension plan termination); IBM Retools Pensions: New Plan Sweeping Corporate America,
U.S.A. TODAY, May 4, 1999, at A1 (estimating that cash balance plans comprised over 12% of
all defined benefit plans in 1998 and that this is a growing trend). Cash balance pension plans
bear a close resemblance to defined contribution plans. One benefit treatise highlights their
fundamental characteristics as follows: “Each participant has an account that is credited with a
dollar amount that resembles an employer contribution and is generally determined as a percentage of pay. Each participant’s account is also credited with interest. The plan usually provides benefits in the form of a lump-sum distribution or annuity.” EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 111 (5th ed.
1997). For an excellent discussion of the reasons that underlie the rising popularity of cash
balance plans, see Anna M. Rappaport et al., Cash Balance Pension Plans, in POSITIONING
PENSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 29-44 (1997).
31. See Mitchell & Schieber, supra note 17, at 9.
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individual idiosyncrasies. Given the mobility of today’s labor force,
employees also have a greater sense of economic security in having
control over their retirement destiny rather than having it rest with
their long-forgotten former employers.
Third, traditional defined benefit plans often compute pensions
on a backloaded basis; that is, benefits are based on a specified percentage of an employee’s final salary. In contrast, defined contribution plan benefits are determined on a frontloaded basis—the earlier
a contribution is made to a plan, the longer will be the time period
of tax-free accumulation. Younger, highly mobile employees who do
not envision working thirty or forty years for the same employer particularly value this frontloading feature.
Fourth, various legislative initiatives have spurred the use of defined contribution plans in the labor market. These initiatives include
permitting the establishment of qualified plans that do not require
(a) employer contributions (e.g., 401(k) plans)32 or (b) employer involvement (e.g., IRAs).33 By the institution of various rollover options, Congress has also facilitated the transfer of retirement wealth
between different qualified plans.34
The dominance of defined contribution plans has a number of
important public policy implications.35 Most relevant to this analysis
is the inherent incentive to retain, rather than distribute, retirement
plan wealth. In a defined benefit plan setting, distributions are typically limited to a single life annuity or, in the case of a married plan
participant, a joint life annuity. That being the case, plan participants
are often anxious to receive as much as possible as quickly as possible
from their defined benefit plans because their benefits cease at death.
The same philosophy, however, does not permeate the defined contribution plan setting. This is because plan participants often have
several distribution options, and they have no financial incentive to
deplete their retirement account balances. To the contrary, their retirement account balances continue to accumulate income tax free,
which inures to their benefit rather than to the benefit of their em32. See I.R.C. § 401(k).
33. See id. § 408.
34. See id. § 402(c).
35. These implications include various concerns such as risk, liquidity, and savings rates.
These implications are analyzed in William G. Gale & Joseph M. Milano, Implications of the
Shift to Defined Contribution Plans for Retirement Wealth Accumulation, in DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS, supra note 17, at 115-35.
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ployer or other plan participants, as is the case in defined benefit
plans. Moreover, upon the death of a plan participant, the retirement
account balance is not extinguished, but, rather, it can be directed to
the plan participant’s beneficiaries.
B. Swelling Retirement Account Balances
In the early 1980s, the number of defined contribution accounts
surged. This, along with other factors (e.g., a blisteringly hot stock
market and a lack of effective statutory coordination between the
maximum defined benefit limitation and the maximum contribution
limits for the various types of defined contribution plans), caused
plan participants’ account balances and vested benefits to swell.36
Their size and cost to the Treasury finally attracted congressional
concern.37
In 1986, Congress instituted two different taxes—an excise tax
on “excess distributions”38 and an additional estate tax on “excess
accumulations”39—in order to discourage the excessive accumulation
of tax-favored retirement wealth.40 Each tax amounted to 15%.41 The
introduction of these taxes had a significant chilling effect on plan
participants’ funding efforts. Practitioners’ journals warned tax advisers to caution plan participants not to be too ambitious in their sheltering attempts lest they risk exposure to these taxes.42 When it came
to funding, moderation was the word; excesses were to be punished.
This state of affairs lasted approximately a decade. The Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996 suspended application of the
36. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 328-32 (1984).
37. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 740 (1985).
38. These were distributions made to plan participants in excess of the greater of (i)
$150,000 or (ii) the indexed amount referred to as the annual threshold amount. See I.R.C. §
4980A(a) (repealed 1997).
39. In general, this amount was equal to the difference between the value of a hypothetical annuity (i.e., a single life annuity based on the decedent’s age at his or her death multiplied by an amount equal to the annual threshold amount in effect in the year in which the
decedent died) and the participant’s account balance. See id. § 4980A(d) (repealed 1997).
40. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1133(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2481
(1986). For a detailed discussion of the purpose and operation of these excise taxes, see Bruce
A. Wolk, The New Excise and Estate Taxes on Excess Retirement Plan Distributions and Accumulations, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 987 (1987).
41. See I.R.C. § 4980A(a), (d) (repealed 1997).
42. See, e.g., Thomas A. Kirschbaum & Louis Kravitz, Minimizing Taxes on Excess Retirement Distributions and Accumulations, 17 TAX’N FOR LAW. 216 (1989).
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excise tax on excess distributions from 1997 through 1999.43 Labeled “success taxes” by their critics, both the excise tax and the additional estate tax were repealed the following year by the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997.44
The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 also repealed the
so-called “§ 415(e) limitation.”45 This limitation applied to plan participants who participated in a defined benefit plan and a defined
contribution plan maintained by the same employer.46 Under this
limitation, such plan participants could not simultaneously take full
advantage of both the maximum permitted defined benefit under the
defined benefit plan and the maximum permitted contribution to the
defined contribution plan.47
The repeal of the excise tax, the additional estate tax, and the
§ 415(e) limitation has had an important effect in transforming the
qualified plan landscape. Plan participants now have a green light to
strive for as much asset growth as possible, even if the amount of
wealth they contribute and the asset growth they achieve on such
contributions far exceeds their (and their spouse’s) retirement needs.
Plan participants now realize that even if they do not reap the harvest
of their qualified plan wealth, their designated beneficiaries will, no
matter how excessive the wealth.48

43. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1452(b),
110 Stat. 1755, 1816 (effective after Dec. 31, 1999). The moratorium on the excess distribution excise tax was declared in hopes of raising revenue as taxpayers had added incentive to
withdraw large amounts from their qualified plans. The theoretical justification offered was that
the same legislation also repealed I.R.C. § 415(e), but not until the year 2000. This Code section imposed a combined limit on benefits from defined benefit and defined contribution plans
maintained by the same employer. See S. REP. NO. 104-281, at 91-92 (1996), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474, 1565-66.
44. Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1073, 111 Stat. 788, 948 (1997). In repealing both excise
taxes, the Senate offered many justifications. “The Committee believes that the limits on contributions and benefits applicable to each type of vehicle are sufficient limits on tax-deferred
savings. Additional penalties are unnecessary, and may also deter individuals from saving. The
excess accumulation and distribution taxes also inappropriately penalize favorable investment
returns.” SENATE COMM. ON FIN., REVENUE RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1997, S. REP. NO.
105-33, at 199-200 (1997).
45. Pub. Law No. 104-188, § 1452(a), 110 Stat. at 1816 (1996).
46. See I.R.C. § 415(e) (repealed 1996).
47. See id.
48. To be sure, there may be estate taxes due upon the death of the plan participant, but
these would have been payable if the same wealth had been accumulated outside of the qualified plan. The estate tax recovers some of the tax subsidy but still leaves much of it in the
hands of the plan participant’s designated beneficiaries.
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C. Introduction to Roth IRAs
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 introduced a new qualified plan
vehicle entitled the Roth IRA.49 Roth IRAs are similar to traditional
IRAs in that contribution limits are comparable and assets held in
both kinds of accounts grow income tax free.50 However, Roth IRAs
are fundamentally different from traditional IRAs. First, only nondeductible contributions can be made to Roth IRAs.51 Second, any
“qualified distribution”52 from a Roth IRA is not includible in gross
income. Third, the minimum distribution rules do not apply until
the death of the account holder.53
These differences have made Roth IRAs a new favorite among
tax planners and their clients.54 There are many reasons for their
popularity, but central among these is the fact that plan participants
may keep their wealth housed in Roth IRAs longer than in any other
retirement planning vehicle. This is because the minimum distribution rules are held in abeyance until the death of the plan participant.55
There is a two thousand dollar annual limitation relating to contributions made to Roth IRAs.56 This limitation, however, cloaks the
tax-deferral opportunity Roth IRAs offer. If a plan participant’s adjusted gross income falls below certain limits, that participant has the
opportunity to roll over amounts from a traditional IRA to a Roth
IRA.57 Although a rollover to a Roth IRA from an employerprovided qualified plan is not allowed, there is nothing to prevent a

49. Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 302(a), 111 Stat. at 825-28.
50. See I.R.C. § 408A(a).
51. See id. § 408A(c)(1).
52. A “qualified distribution” means any payment or distribution (a) made on or after
the date on which the individual reaches age 59½, (b) made to a beneficiary (or to the estate of
the individual) on or after the individual’s death, (c) attributable to the individual’s being disabled, or (d) which is a qualified “special purpose” distribution (i.e., for any qualified first-time
homebuyer to which I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(F) applies). See id. § 408(d)(4)(A).
53. See id. § 408A(c)(4).
54. See, e.g., Lynn Asinof, Stuck for a Gift Idea for a Favorite Child? A Surprising Choice
May be a ROTH IRA, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1998, at C1; Laura Saunders, In Roth We Trust,
FORBES, Apr. 20, 1998, at 466. For a stinging critique of the fiscal damage the use of Roth
IRAs will wreak on the treasury, see Daniel Halperin, I Want a ROTH IRA for Xmas, 82 TAX
NOTES 1567 (1998).
55. See supra note 53.
56. See § 408A(c)(2)(A).
57. See id. § 408A(c)(3)(B).
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participant from first rolling over the qualified plan distribution into
a traditional IRA and then making a rollover to a Roth IRA. Of
course, the rollover from the traditional IRA to the Roth IRA is fully
taxable, but if the resulting tax can be paid from other savings, the
overall effect of the rollover is to permit even greater tax subsidies to
flow to the plan participant. From a practical perspective, what this
rollover ability means is that plan participants may contribute tremendous amounts of wealth into Roth IRAs and stay the application
of the minimum distribution rules, at least until their death.
D. Miscellaneous Factors
Aside from the changes mentioned in the prior three subsections,
there are two other factors that make an evaluation of the minimum
distribution rules particularly timely. First, over the past decade,
marginal federal income tax rates have gradually risen from a low of
28% in 1986 to where they are today at 39.6%. Higher income tax
rates function as qualified plan fertilizer, creating added incentive for
plan participants (particularly those whose incomes are taxed in the
higher tax brackets) to shelter their otherwise taxable income by
making qualified plan contributions.58 Moreover, the imposition of
higher income tax rates entices plan participants to hold their accumulated wealth in the tax-free sanctuary of qualified plans for as long
as possible.
A final reason to examine the minimum distribution rules now is
the coming crisis in funding Social Security and Medicare. Many
studies indicate that within the next two or three decades Social Security and Medicare will fall short of being able to sustain themselves
financially.59 The question on the minds of commentators and politicians alike is how to maintain their solvency. Given that the largest
source of private wealth in the world is currently held by qualified
plans, some commentators have raised the idea that plan assets
and/or earnings on these assets should be taxed.60
58. See generally, Robert L. Clark & Sylvester J. Schieber, Factors Affecting Participation
Rates and Contribution Levels in 401(k) Plans, in DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS, supra
note 17, at 69-97.
59. See SOCIAL SEC. AND MEDICARE BDS. OF TRUSTEES, STATUS OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS 6-10 (1996).
60. Before the recent era of projected budget surpluses, some commentators and members of the General Accounting Office and Congressional Budget Office maintained that the
wealth of qualified plans should be used to help erase the federal deficit and simultaneously
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E. Summary
The recent dominance of defined contribution plans; the repeal of the excise tax, additional estate tax, and limitations that once
discouraged bountiful account balances; and the introduction of
Roth IRAs have significantly altered the retirement planning landscape. The convergence of these events, along with relatively high
income tax rates during a time when Social Security and Medicare
are struggling to maintain their solvency, has catapulted the minimum distribution rules to a new level of importance. As the baby
boomer generation nears retirement, the tension between the natural
desire of taxpayers to maximize tax deferral via qualified plans and
the government’s need for tax revenue can only increase.
III. MECHANICS OF THE MINIMUM DISTRIBUTION RULES
This Section, which details the current system for regulating
minimum distributions from qualified plans, is apt to prove challenging and frustrating. This reflects the fact that the minimum distribution rules themselves are inherently complex and difficult to comprehend. They are replete with special definitions, general rules,
exceptions, and exceptions to the exceptions.61 But before delving
into the rules, an example of their operation illustrates the extraordinary benefit that tax-free compounding offers plan participants under
the existing minimum distribution rules.
A. An Example of the Minimum Distribution Rules
This subsection illustrates the distribution effect under the current minimum distribution rules, using data set forth in Table I. Assume that Owner, age seventy, has $1,000,000 in an IRA. Assume
facilitate Social Security funding. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE
DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS 299 (1994) (estimating that a 5% tax on investment income of pension plans and IRAs would raise revenue by $6.9 billion in year 1 and
$13.6 billion in year 5); Alicia Munnell, Current Taxation of Qualified Pension Plans: Has the
Time Come?, NEW ENG. ECON. REV. Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 12 (advocating a 15% tax on all employer contributions to pension and profit sharing arrangements as well as a 15% levy on the
annual earnings of such arrangements).
61. In describing the difficulty of explaining the minimum distribution rules to friends,
one author of this analysis makes the following comparison: Attempting to master the minimum distribution rules is like going into a field and trying to catch grasshoppers in a glass jar.
You have to make numerous attempts to catch one. Each successful catch makes the next more
difficult, and when the hunt is over, what’s left in the glass jar is not exactly a pretty sight.
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further that Owner has a Spouse, age sixty-six, and a Child, age
forty. Owner and Spouse both live until age eighty-five and both
elect not to recalculate life expectancies. When Owner dies, Spouse
rolls over the account into Spouse’s own IRA, elects the term certain
method, and names Child as the beneficiary. After Spouse’s death,
Child is permitted to continue to receive distributions for twentyfour more years. (The subsections that follow explain the nonrecalculation or “term certain” option as well as the reasons why Spouse
and Child can continue to receive benefits under the IRA.)
The example assumes a pre-tax investment return of 8% on the
assets held by the IRA. This percentage times the “Beginning IRA
Value” less the “Minimum Distribution” results in the “Ending IRA
Value.” The example also assumes that the distributions out of the
IRA are taxable at a combined federal and state income tax rate of
43%. Finally, once out of the IRA, the example assumes that these
proceeds grow at an after-tax investment return of 6.4% (reflecting
the fact that some returns will be taxable at lower long-term capital
gains rates). These assumptions produce the final column labeled
“Accumulated Distributions.”
When Owner dies, the minimum distribution drops from
$153,417 to $68,079, and when Spouse dies at age eighty-five, the
minimum distribution drops from $82,388 to $47,730. The reason
for these drops will be explained shortly. If Child dies before age
eighty-three, Child’s heirs can continue the same distribution
scheme; there is no acceleration of distributions due to Child’s
death.
Table I
Minimum Distribution Rules Illustration
Year Owner’s Spouse’s Child’s Beginning

Minimum

Ending

Accumulated

Age

Age

Age

IRA Value

Distribution IRA Value

1

70

66

40

$1,000,000

$44,444

$1,035,556

Distributions
$25,333

2

71

67

41

$1,035,556

$48,165

$1,070,235

$54,409

3

72

68

42

$1,070,235

$52,207

$1,103,647

$87,649

4

73

69

43

$1,103,647

$56,597

$1,135,341

$125,519

5

74

70

44

$1,135,341

$61,370

$1,164,799

$168,533

6

75

71

45

$1,164,799

$66,560

$1,191,423

$217,258

7

76

72

46

$1,191,423

$72,207

$1,214,529

$272,321

8

77

73

47

$1,214,529

$78,357

$1,233,335

$334,413
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Year Owner’s Spouse’s Child’s Beginning
Age

Age

Age

IRA Value

Minimum

Ending

Distribution IRA Value

Accumulated
Distributions

9

78

74

48

$1,233,335

$85,058

$1,246,944

$404,298

10

79

75

49

$1,246,944

$92,366

$1,254,333

$482,822

11

80

76

50

$1,254,333

$100,347

$1,254,333

$570,920

12

81

77

51

$1,254,333

$109,072

$1,245,607

$669,630

13

82

78

52

$1,245,607

$118,629

$1,226,627

$780,105

14

83

79

53

$1,226,627

$129,119

$1,195,638

$903,629

15

84

80

54

$1,195,638

$140,663

$1,150,626

$1,041,640

16

85

81

55

$1,150,626

$153,417

$1,089,259

$1,195,752

17

82

56

$1,089,259

$68,079

$1,108,321

$1,311,085

18

83

57

$1,108,321

$72,439

$1,124,548

$1,436,285

19

84

58

$1,124,548

$77,555

$1,136,957

$1,572,414

20

85

59

$1,136,957

$82,388

$1,145,525

$1,720,010

21

60

$1,145,525

$47,730

$1,189,437

$1,857,296

22

61

$1,189,437

$51,715

$1,232,877

$2,005,641

23

62

$1,232,877

$56,040

$1,275,467

$2,165,944

24

63

$1,275,467

$60,737

$1,316,768

$2,339,185

25

64

$1,316,768

$65,838

$1,356,271

$2,526,420

26

65

$1,356,271

$71,383

$1,393,390

$2,728,800

27

66

$1,393,390

$77,411

$1,427,451

$2,947,567

28

67

$1,427,451

$83,968

$1,457,679

$3,184,073

29

68

$1,457,679

$91,105

$1,483,189

$3,439,783

30

69

$1,483,189

$98,879

$1,502,964

$3,716,290

31

70

$1,502,964

$107,355

$1,515,847

$4,015,325

32

71

$1,515,847

$116,604

$1,520,511

$4,338,770

33

72

$1,520,511

$126,709

$1,515,443

$4,688,675

34

73

$1,515,443

$137,768

$1,498,911

$5,067,278

35

74

$1,498,911

$149,891

$1,468,933

$5,477,022

36

75

$1,468,933

$163,215

$1,423,232

$5,920,584

37

76

$1,423,232

$177,904

$1,359,187

$6,400,906

38

77

$1,359,187

$194,170

$1,273,752

$6,921,241

39

78

$1,273,752

$212,292

$1,163,360

$7,485,207

40

79

$1,163,360

$232,672

$1,023,757

$8,096,883

41

80

$1,023,757

$255,939

$849,718

$8,760,969

42

81

$849,718

$283,239

$634,456

$9,483,118

43

82

$634,456

$317,228

$367,985

$10,270,857

44

83

$367,985

$397,424

$0

$11,154,724
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What is striking about Table I is the last entry of the “Accumulated Distributions” column. It should come as no surprise that the
value of an investment can greatly multiply over a forty-four year period given the effects of compounding at a steady rate of return. But
compare this figure with what would have been accumulated had the
$1,000,000 held in the IRA been initially distributed to Owner at
the beginning of Year 1, i.e., had there been no further tax subsidy.
Under the same rate-of-return and tax-rate assumptions, the
$1,000,000 would have been immediately subject to a tax of
$430,000, leaving a balance of $570,000. By the end of the fortyfour year period, this balance, rather than growing to $11,154,724
as provided in Table I, would have instead grown to only
$8,735,877. The difference between $11,154,724 and $8,735,877,
$2,418,847, represents the cost to the government of permitting tax
deferral during Owner’s retirement as well as over the time period
during which Spouse and Child enjoyed Owner’s inheritance.
Bluntly put, the roughly $2.4 million difference represents a rather
hefty government grant to the Owner and his family.
B. Lexicon of Important Terms Under the Minimum Distribution
Rules
This subsection introduces a set of technical terms central to the
comprehension of the minimum distribution rules.
1. Required beginning date
Integral to mastery of the minimum distribution rules is the concept known as the “required beginning date” (“RBD”). Distributions from a qualified plan (other than a Roth IRA) must commence
on or prior to the RBD.62 Failure to make the requisite distribution
by a participant’s RBD results in the imposition of a 50% excise tax,
as described infra in subsection III.D. 63
The RBD for plan participants who are still actively employed by
their employer differs from those who are not. The RBD for any
employee who is a participant in an employer’s qualified plan (and

62. Distributions from a Roth IRA may be suspended until the plan participant’s death,
see I.R.C. § 408A(c)(5), at which time the minimum distribution rules then apply, see id. §
401(a)(9)(B).
63. See id. § 4974.
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who is not a 5% owner of the employer at any time)64 is April 1 following the year of retirement, if such employee retires after age
70½.65 For all other plan participants, the RBD is April 1 of the year
following the year they attain age 70½.66
2. Minimum distribution amount
Once plan participants determine their RBD, they must next determine the amount the plan must distribute to them in order to
avoid the imposition of the 50% excise tax. The minimum distribution amount must be paid each distribution calendar year.67
In the case of a defined benefit plan, distributions are generally
made in the form of annuity payments. Starting at the participant’s
RBD, these annuity payments must be paid periodically at intervals
not longer than one year using (1) the life expectancy of the plan
participant or joint life and last survivor expectancy of the plan participant and a designated beneficiary, if any, or (2) a period certain
not longer than a life expectancy or joint life and last survivor expectancy of the plan participant and a designated beneficiary, if any.68 To
help ensure that the majority of the qualified plan assets inure to the
benefit of the plan participant, annuity payments must conform to
the minimum distribution incidental benefit requirement.69 This requirement limits the period certain over which annuity payments can

64. The determination of whether or not an employee is a 5% owner is made in accordance with I.R.C. § 416 but is made without regard to whether the plan is top-heavy. See id. §
401(a)(9)(C)(ii)(I); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A B-2(d)(2), 52 Fed. Reg.
28,070, 28,076 (1987).
65. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(C)(i)(II). To illustrate, suppose A is a rank-and-file employee
of company X. If A participates in X’s defined contribution plan and retires at the end of 2001
at the age of 75, a minimum distribution out of the plan would have to commence on or before April 1, 2002.
66. See id. § 401(a)(9)(C)(i)(I). To illustrate, suppose B retires at age 65 from company
Y and he soon thereafter rolls over his retirement account balance into an IRA. If B turns 70½
in 2001, the minimum distribution out of the IRA would have to be made on or before April
1, 2002.
67. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A F-1(b), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,084. The
first distribution calendar year is the later of the year (a) a plan participant attains age 70½ or
(b) the employee retires or becomes a 5% owner of the employer. See id. This rule applies on a
plan-by-plan basis (i.e., a plan participant who participates in more than one qualified plan may
have different distribution calendar years for each). See id.
68. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A F-3(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,084.
69. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A F-4A, 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,086; infra
subsection III.B.4.
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be made and the payment percentage that can inure to a designated
beneficiary.70 Typically, upon the death of the plan participant (or
the plan participant’s designated beneficiary), the plan’s annuity
payment obligations cease.71
In the case of a defined contribution plan (including IRAs), the
process of determining the minimum distribution amount involves a
simple computation involving a numerator and a divisor. Subject to
certain adjustments,72 the numerator is the account balance on the
last valuation date in the calendar year before a distribution calendar
year.73 The divisor is generally the applicable life expectancy, which is
the life expectancy of the plan participant (or the joint life and last
survivor expectancy of the plan participant and the plan participant’s
designated beneficiary):74
Participant’s Account Balance
Applicable Life Expectancy
The applicable life expectancy is determined using the participant’s (and the designated beneficiary’s) age on the participant’s
birthday (and the designated beneficiary’s birthday) in the calendar
year prior to the participant’s RBD.75 Life expectancies are set forth
in Tables V and VI of Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9.76
Example: Owner turns age seventy on June 17, 1999, and
he is married to Spouse, who is four years younger. Owner
has an IRA with an account balance of $1,000,000 on De70. To illustrate this latter point, consider what would happen if a plan participant
names her granddaughter as the designated beneficiary and the granddaughter is 40 years junior to the plan participant. In this case, annual annuity payments to the granddaughter cannot
exceed 54% of the amount of annual annuity payments made to the plan participant. The table
that sets forth these percentage limitations is found in Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-2,
Q&A 6(b)(2), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,100.
71. If distributions from a defined benefit plan are not in the form of an annuity, the
plan participant’s benefit will be treated as an individual account for purposes of determining
the minimum distribution amount. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A F-3(e), 52
Fed. Reg. at 28,085.
72. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A F-5(b)-(c), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,086.
For example, increasing for allocations of contributions or forfeitures and decreasing for distributions.
73. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A F-5(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,026.
74. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A F-1(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,083.
75. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A E-1(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,080.
76. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A E-3 & 4, 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,081.
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cember 31, 1998. Owner may determine his minimum distribution amount for 1999 (his first distribution calendar
year) using his own life expectancy of sixteen years. This
would produce a minimum distribution amount equal to
$62,500 ($1,000,000/16). Alternatively, were Spouse
named as Owner’s designated beneficiary, Owner could use
their joint life expectancy of 22.5 years. This would produce
a minimum distribution amount equal to $44,444
($1,000,000/22.5) for the 1999 distribution calendar year.
This is precisely how the minimum distribution amount was
computed in Table I.
Note that the larger the divisor, the smaller the minimum distribution amount. The smaller the minimum distribution amount, the
larger the retirement account balance that remains and the greater
the income tax deferral. If the designated beneficiary is more than
ten years younger than the plan participant and is not the plan participant’s spouse, a smaller number known as the “applicable divisor”
is used as the divisor instead of the applicable life expectancy.77 This
is an application of the minimum distribution incidental benefit requirement, which is discussed infra subsection III.B.4.
Unless the terms of a plan provide otherwise or a plan participant
elects to the contrary, a plan participant’s life expectancy (or the joint
life and last survivor expectancy of the plan participant and spouse) is
recalculated annually.78 The Treasury regulation tables supply the
applicable life expectancy or joint life expectancies, as the case may
be, based on the participant’s and spouse’s (if applicable) attained
ages as of their birthdays in that distribution calendar year.79 Alternatively, a plan participant may elect not to have his (or his spouse’s)
life expectancy recalculated.80 Instead, the life expectancy would be
decreased by one each year to determine the minimum distribution
amount. This is known as the “term certain method.”81 In the case

77. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-2, Q&A 4 & 5, 52 Fed. Reg at 28,098-99.
78. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A E-8(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,082; See
generally, David Johnson, Recalculating the Life Expectancy Election, TR. & EST., Nov. 1990,
at 8.
79. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A E-1(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,080; supra
text accompanying notes 75-76.
80. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A E-7(b), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,082.
81. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9712032 (Mar. 21, 1997).
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of a designated beneficiary other than the surviving spouse, the term
certain method must be used to determine the divisor.82
Example: Using the example in Table I, the joint life expectancy of Owner and Spouse in the first distribution year (Year
1) is 22.5. Since in this example the participant has elected
not to recalculate life expectancies, each year the divisor will
be reduced by one. Thus, in Year 2 it is 21.5, and the minimum distribution is $48,165 ($1,035,556/21.5). By Year
16, the year of Owner’s death, the divisor is 7.5. What happens after Owner’s death is discussed below.
3. Designated beneficiary
In general, having a designated beneficiary allows the plan participant to use the joint life and last survivor tables to compute the
minimum distribution amount, resulting in smaller minimum distribution amounts and maximizing income deferral. For purposes of
the minimum distribution rules, only individuals (and individual
beneficiaries of certain kinds of trusts)83 may be designated beneficiaries.84 The terms of a plan may name the designated beneficiary, or,
82. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(D); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A E-8(b), 52
Fed. Reg. at 28,083. However, the incidental benefit requires a recalculation of the designated
beneficiary’s life expectancy, at least until the death of plan participant. This rule is reflected in
the tables under Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-2, Q&A 6, 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,099-100.
83. If a trust is named as beneficiary of a plan participant, all beneficiaries of the trust
may be treated as having been designated as beneficiaries of the participant. See Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A D-5(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,080 (as amended by 62 Fed. Reg.
67,780, 67,783 (1997)). This will happen if, as of the later of the date on which the trust is
named as a beneficiary of the participant or the participant’s required beginning date, and as of
all subsequent periods during which the trust is named as a beneficiary, the four following requirements are met: (1) the trust is a valid trust under state law, or would be but for the fact
that there is no corpus; (2) the trust is irrevocable or will, by its terms, become irrevocable
upon the death of the plan participant; (3) the beneficiaries of the trust are identifiable from
the trust instrument; and (4) the plan administrator must be provided with either a copy of the
trust instrument or a certified list of all beneficiaries (including contingent and remainderman
beneficiaries with a description of the conditions on their entitlement). See id. § 1.401(A)(9)-1,
Q&A D-5(b), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,080 (as amended by 62 Fed. Reg. at 67,783). In addition,
within nine months after the plan participant’s death, the trustee must provide the plan administrator with a copy of the trust or provide the plan administrator with a final list of trust beneficiaries (including contingent and remainderman beneficiaries with a description of the conditions on their entitlement). See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A D-7, 62 Fed. Reg.
67,780, 67,784 (1997).
84. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A D-2A(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,079.
Note that the members of a class of beneficiaries capable of expansion or contraction (e.g., the
participant’s children) will be treated as being identifiable if it is possible at the applicable time
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if the terms of the plan provide, plan participants may name an individual or trust as a beneficiary.85 For purposes of computing the
minimum distribution amount, the participant’s designated beneficiary will ordinarily be determined at the earlier of either the participant’s death or as of the participant’s RBD.86 If there is more than
one designated beneficiary, the one with the shortest life expectancy
will be used to determine the required minimum distribution
amount.87
4. Minimum distribution incidental benefit (“MDIB”) requirement
The primary purpose of a qualified plan must be to provide retirement benefits or deferred compensation.88 Any other benefit
must be incidental.89
Basically, under the MDIB requirement for computing the applicable life expectancy, any nonspouse who is a designated beneficiary
is treated as being no more than ten years younger than the participant.90 In the case of defined benefit plans, the MDIB functions in a
similar fashion by requiring that distributions made to plan participants not be too small relative to those that are to be made to their
designated beneficiaries.91
There are two important limitations on the application of the
MDIB requirement. First, if the participant’s spouse is the desig-

to identify the class member with the shortest life expectancy. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A D-2(a)(1), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,079.
85. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A D-2(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,079.
86. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A D-3(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,079.
87. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A E-5(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,081.
88. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(as amended in 1976); supra note 11 and accompanying text.
89. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(G); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-2, 52 Fed. Reg. at
28,098. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the Treasury Department had set forth a MDIB
requirement in a number of revenue rulings interpreting the term “incidental” as applied to
death benefits. See supra note 14. The purpose of this requirement was to limit the portion of
the participant’s benefit that would be paid after the participant’s death. The policy justification for tax subsidized death benefits is much weaker than for subsidized retirement benefits.
The MDIB requirement has now been made a part of the minimum distribution requirements.
Thus, distributions must satisfy not only the regular minimum distribution rules discussed
above but also the MDIB requirement as well.
90. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(G); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-2, 52 Fed. Reg. at
28,098.
91. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-2, Q&A 6(b)(2), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,100.
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nated beneficiary, the MDIB requirement does not apply.92 Second,
after the death of the participant, the MDIB requirement no longer
applies, and the applicable life expectancy that would have been used
absent the MDIB requirement is then used to compute the minimum distribution amount.93 As the following example illustrates, the
latter restriction has significant income tax deferral repercussions.
Example: Recall from the example in Table I that when
Owner dies in Year 16 and Spouse rolls over the IRA into
his/her own, Spouse names Child as the designated beneficiary. Without the MDIB requirement, the minimum distribution divisor for Year 17 could be based on Spouse’s and
Child’s joint life expectancy as of that year, which under the
Treasury’s tables is twenty-eight. But since Child is more
than ten years younger than Spouse, the MDIB requirement
limits the divisor to sixteen, the “applicable divisor” in the
Treasury’s table.94 Thus, the minimum distribution for Year
17 is $68,079 ($1,089,259/16). When Spouse dies in Year
20, distributions in future years are no longer subject to the
MDIB requirement. In Year 21, the remainder of the applicable life expectancy is twenty-eight (the Child’s and
Spouse’s original joint and survivor life expectancy when
minimum distributions commenced to Spouse) less four (the
number of years that elapsed from the Spouse’s first distribution year to the date of Spouse’s death), and the minimum
distribution is $47,730 ($1,145,525/24). The divisor is reduced by one in each of the next twenty-three years. 95

92. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-2, Q&A 7(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,100.
93. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A F-3A(b)(1), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,085.
94. The MDIB requirement establishes a table specifying a limit on the divisor, which
changes each year based on the plan participant’s age during the distribution year. See Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-2, Q&A-4, 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,098-99.
95. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A E-8(c), Exs. 1 & 2, F-3A(b)(1), 52
Fed. Reg. at 28,083, 28,085. To illustrate the more powerful effects this rule has when a plan
participant names an even younger designated beneficiary, consider the following fact pattern.
Assume that an employee, age 70, names his grandchild, age 10, as his beneficiary under his
profit-sharing plan. The employee elects installment payments over their joint life expectancy,
which is 71.8 using Table VI of Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9. This would permit the employee to receive as little as 1/71.8 of his account for the first distribution year. The MDIB requirement
limits the divisor. For an employee age 70 the divisor is 26.2, which is essentially just the joint
life expectancy of a 70 year old and a 60 year old. The payments can still be spread out over
the joint life expectancy of the employee and the grandchild, but they will be considerably
skewed toward the earlier years when the employee is more likely to be alive. Once the employee dies, however, the MDIB requirement no longer applies. Thus, if the employee dies at
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Understanding these definitions will clarify the discussion that
follows of how the minimum distribution rules operate.
C. Application of the Minimum Distribution Rules
Distributions made during the life of the plan participant may be
made before or after the participant’s RBD. Distributions made after
the death of the plan participant will occur either before or after the
participant’s RBD.
1. Distributions during the life of the plan participant
a. Before RBD. In general, the minimum distribution rules do
not apply with respect to distributions made prior to the participant’s
RBD.96 Plan participants may, therefore, prolong the time period before which distributions have to be made from their qualified plans.
For example, in the case of the active octogenarian who participates
in his employer’s qualified plan, distributions from such a plan do
not have to commence until the employee retires, say at age ninety.
Plan participants are thus free to capitalize upon the tax-free status of
their qualified plans.
b. After RBD. In order not to jeopardize a qualified plan’s taxexempt status, or to prevent the plan participant from incurring a
50% excise tax, distributions of the minimum distribution amount
from a qualified plan must commence at the participant’s RBD.97
Subject to the MDIB requirement, distributions may be made (1)
over the life of such participant, (2) over a term certain that does not
exceed the actuarial life expectancy of the plan participant, (3) over
the lives of the participant and a designated beneficiary, or (4) over a
term certain that does not exceed the actuarial life expectancy of the
plan participant and a designated beneficiary.98
2. Distributions after the death of the plan participant
a. Death of plan participant before the RBD. If the plan participant dies prior to the RBD, distributions must be made under one of

age 72 1/2 (during the third distribution year), the payments to the grandchild can be spread
out over the remainder of their joint life expectancy, i.e., 71.8 less 3, or 68.8 years. See id.
96. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A B-3A, 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,077.
97. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9).
98. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A B-1(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,076.
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two methods. The first method is the five-year rule under §
401(a)(9)(B)(ii). This method requires that the entire interest of the
participant be distributed within five years of the participant’s death
(i.e., on or before December 31 of the fifth calendar year after the
participant’s death)99 regardless of to whom or to what entity the
distribution is made.100
The second method is the exception to the five-year rule under §
401(a)(9)(B)(iii). This method, which presumes that the plan participant has named a designated beneficiary, requires that any portion
of a participant’s interest that is payable to (or for the benefit of) a
designated beneficiary be distributed, commencing within one year
of the plan participant’s death (i.e., on or before December 31 of the
first calendar year after a plan participant’s death)101 and extending
over the life of such beneficiary (or over a period certain not extending beyond the life expectancy of such beneficiary).102
If the participant’s spouse is the designated beneficiary, the surviving spouse has two options. Under the first option, distributions
may commence on or before the later of (1) December 31 of the
calendar year immediately following the calendar year in which the
plan participant died or (2) December 31 of the calendar year in
which the plan participant would have attained age 70½.103 Under
the second option, the surviving spouse may elect to roll over the
plan participant’s account to an IRA (assuming this is a permissible
distribution option),104 thus deferring distributions until April 1 of
the calendar year following the year in which the surviving spouse attains age 70½. In addition, the surviving spouse has the ability to
name new designated beneficiaries.105

99. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A C-2, 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,077.
100. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(B)(ii); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A C-1(a), 52
Fed. Reg. at 28,077. To illustrate, suppose A, a participant of Plan X, dies on July 15, 2000, at
age 65 and his designated beneficiary is his estate. In accordance the five-year rule, the entire
account balance of Plan X must be distributed to A’s estate by Dec. 31, 2005.
101. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A C-3(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,077-78.
102. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(B)(iii); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A C-1(a), 52
Fed. Reg. at 28,077.
103. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A C-3(b), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,075.
104. See I.R.C. § 402(c).
105. The ability to name a new designated beneficiary is an important tax deferral device.
The selection of a designated beneficiary who is younger than the plan participant (or his or
her spouse) has the direct effect of reducing the minimum distribution amount.
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b. Death of the plan participant after RBD. In general, if a plan
participant dies after the participant’s RBD, an “at least as rapidly”
rule applies. That is, the account balance of the plan participant must
be distributed “at least as rapidly” as the method being used for distribution as of the date of the participant’s death.106 How this rule
applies and its implications depend upon whether the participant has
named a designated beneficiary.
If the participant fails to name a designated beneficiary (e.g., the
plan participant names his estate as the beneficiary) and if the participant is recalculating his life expectancy, the entire account balance
must be distributed by December 31 of the year following the participant’s death.107 Alternatively, if there is no designated beneficiary
and the participant had elected the term certain method, distributions may be made over the remaining designated period.108
If the participant dies after the participant’s RBD and the participant has named a designated beneficiary, the remaining portion of
such interest must be distributed to the designated beneficiary at
least as rapidly as under the distribution method being used as of the
date of the participant’s death.109 Because the MDIB requirement,
however, does not apply after the participant’s death, the applicable
divisor no longer applies. Instead, the divisor used to determine the
minimum distribution amount is either (1) the joint life expectancy
of the plan participant and the designated beneficiary at the commencement of distributions less the number of years that have
elapsed since the RBD (where the plan participant had elected the
term certain method) or (2) the designated beneficiary’s life expectancy at the commencement of distributions less the number of years
that have elapsed since the RBD (where the plan participant had
used the recalculation method).110
If the participant names the participant’s surviving spouse as the
designated beneficiary, the surviving spouse has two options. Under
the first option, the surviving spouse can continue to receive minimum distributions under the schedule in place at the participant’s

106.
107.
108.
28,085.
109.
110.
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See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(B)(i).
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A E-8(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,082.
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A B-4, F-3A(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,077,
See id.
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-2, Q&A 7(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,100.
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death.111 Under the second option, the surviving spouse may roll
over the participant’s account balance into an IRA (assuming this is a
permissible distribution option).112 In addition, the surviving spouse
has the ability to name new designated beneficiaries. (The second
option was used by Spouse in the Table I example, which resulted in
the deferral of distributions far beyond the joint lives of Owner and
Spouse.)
D. Failure to Comply with the Minimum Distribution Rules and the
Imposition of the 50% Excise Tax
To encourage compliance with the minimum distribution rules,
Congress has instituted a 50% excise tax on the difference between
the amount of the minimum distribution and the amount, if any,
that was actually distributed to the plan participant.113 However, the
tax can be waived if a plan participant can show that the participant’s
failure to receive the entire minimum distribution is due to reasonable error and reasonable steps are instituted to remedy the shortfall.114
IV. EVALUATION OF THE MINIMUM DISTRIBUTION RULES
An analysis of the minimum distribution rules reveals their flaws.
The rules are administratively daunting, making compliance difficult
and costly, especially given the large number of taxpayers affected. At
the same time, the rules are inequitable because benefits inure primarily to high-income earners.
A. Administration of the Minimum Distribution Rules
1. Complexity
By any standard, the minimum distribution rules are horrendously complex. First, the rules require mastery of special terms of
111. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A E-7(c), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,082.
112. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9534027 (Aug. 25, 1995) (under the authority of Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.408-8, Q&A A-4(b), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28102-03, the surviving spouse may
claim the participant’s IRA as the surviving spouse’s own).
113. See I.R.C. § 4974(a). To illustrate, suppose A is a participant in Plan Z. If A’s minimum distribution from Plan Z is $10,000 and A withdraws $7,000, then the excise tax would
be equal to $1,500 (.50 x ($10,000 - $7,000)).
114. See id. § 4974(d).
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art that have the aura of mystical incantations. People who speak in
minimum-distribution-rule parlance have a language of their own.
Their conversations are punctuated by cryptic phrases, where legions
of acronyms abound.115 Outsiders to the minimum-distribution-rule
expert clique are rendered linguistically impotent, unable to communicate and reliant on the expertise of others.
Second, the minimum distribution rules involve numbing detail.
Unlike many Code provisions that provide a general rule with one or
two exceptions, the minimum distribution rules provide a series of
general rules that are riddled with numerous exceptions and exceptions to those exceptions. Indeed, the regulations that elaborate on
the technical meaning of the statute span over forty single-spaced
pages.116 The outcome of this complexity is that plan participants, tax
planners, and brokerage houses all too often commit inadvertent
planning errors.117
Finally, the minimum distribution rules spawn additional complexity in other areas of tax planning. Consider, for example, the
plight of married taxpayers who participate in qualified plans. A married individual may wish to establish trusts that qualify for the estate
tax marital deduction for the benefit of the surviving spouse. In order to qualify for the estate tax marital deduction, the terms of such
trusts must provide that the surviving spouse annually receives all
trust income.118 Coordinating the plan participant’s dual objectives
of satisfying the estate tax marital deduction and minimum distribution rules is not an easy task. It requires an extraordinary amount of
careful (and expensive) tax planning involving the use of special trust
provisions and the issuance of special instructions to plan administrators.119 Plan participants who already had a hard time comprehend115. For example, you might hear a minimum-distribution-rule pundit say, “You’re nearing your RBD. Did you receive your minimum distribution during this distribution calendar
year?” Alternatively, you might hear another such pundit say, “I’m using the recalculation
method based on my ALE and my spouse is using the term certain method. We have chosen a
qualifying trust as our contingent designated beneficiary.”
116. See 6 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶¶ 17,724-17,725 (2000).
117. See, e.g., Lynn Asinof, Oops . . . How a Variety of Basic Foul-Ups Are Bedeviling the
Beneficiaries of IRAs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 1999, at C1; Mary Rowland, Who’s Advising Financial Advisors?, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1993, at B2.
118. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii).
119. The Service has fortunately issued guidance in this perplexing and evolving area of
the law. See Rev. Rul. 2000-2, 2000-3 I.R.B. 305. The ruling clarifies that the trustee of the
marital deduction trust (usually what is known as a QTIP trust) does not have to withdraw
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ing the dynamics of their estate plans undoubtedly find that the
minimum distribution rules add another unwelcome and cumbersome dimension of complexity.120
2. Enforceability by the Internal Revenue Service
The complex nature of the minimum distribution rules along
with the absence of any congressionally mandated oversight requirements makes enforcement by the Service difficult.121 For example, plan participants make supposedly irrevocable elections in determining their minimum distribution amounts, such as whether to
recalculate life expectancies and who is named as the designated
beneficiary. Despite the importance of these elections, the Service receives no independent verification of what they are in the form of inIRA income annually. All that is required is that the spouse have the power, exercisable annually, to compel the trustee to withdraw the IRA income and pay it to the spouse.
Note that the trustee must still withdraw the required minimum distribution amount. The
issue considered in the ruling is whether the trustee has to withdraw even more if the IRA income exceeds this amount. It is therefore crucial to draft the trust to specifically give the
spouse the requisite power over the IRA income.
120. See Marcia Chadwick Holt, Retirement Planning: A Practical Guide to Making the
Tough Choices, 29 MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN., ¶¶ 400-410.10 (1995); Louis A. Mezzullo,
Serving an Ace Without a Foot Fault When Planning for Qualified Plan Benefits: Spousal Rollovers, Excise Taxes, Charitable Bequests, and IRAs, 32 MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN., ¶¶ 1100.11103.6 (1998).
121. See Jay A. Soled, When Will Congress Police the Minimum Distribution Rules, 86 TAX
NOTES 1003 (2000).
The complexity of the minimum distribution rules has perhaps led the Service to embrace
taxpayer-friendly positions in developing responses to several private ruling requests. Consider,
for example, the outcome reached in Private Letter Ruling 199915063 (Apr. 16, 1999). In
this ruling, when the plan participant reached his RBD, he named his designated beneficiaries.
This designation gave the plan participant the opportunity to use the dual life expectancy tables
in determining the minimum distribution amount. The plan participant, however, instead
elected to have the minimum distribution amounts computed using only his recalculated life
expectancy. Upon the plan participant’s death, in accordance with the regulations, the plan
participant’s life expectancy was reduced to zero. Despite this fact, the Service ruled that the
“at least as rapidly rule” would serve to penalize the plan participant just because he had chosen to take distributions in a more rapid fashion than he was required. Instead, because the
plan participant had timely chosen his designated beneficiary by his RBD, “the applicable life
expectancy [for purposes of determining the minimum distribution amounts] is the life expectancy of the designated beneficiary.” Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199915063 (Apr. 16, 1999). This ruling
and others like it show incredible tolerance on the part of the Service. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul.
199908063 (Feb. 26, 1999) (surviving spouse is deemed designated beneficiary where IRA
named estate as the beneficiary and surviving spouse was the sole beneficiary of the estate).
This tolerance is probably attributable to the fact that the Service empathizes with the plight of
plan participants and their advisors in comprehending the complexities of the minimum distribution rules.
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formation returns. This is in stark contrast to other areas of the law
where the issuance of information returns plays a vital role in ensuring taxpayer compliance.122 This absence of direct oversight means
that plan participants who supposedly make irrevocable, yet illconceived, elections may make changes with virtual impunity.
3. Tactics targeted to maximize tax deferral
The significant economic benefits of tax deferral motivate plan
participants and their advisors to exploit the weaknesses of the minimum distribution rules.123 Often, however, plan participants fail to
comprehend the full consequences associated with the adoption of
such strategies, fostering plan participant confusion and frustration.
Such strategies for prolonged tax deferral incur costs not only to society in the form of lost revenue but also to plan participants in the
form of hefty legal and actuarial fees. Adopting these strategies also
contributes to the difficulties of making the minimum distribution
rules easier to administer. The following three subsections illustrate
some of the tactics used to maximize tax deferral.
a. Naming the plan participant’s children as the designated beneficiaries and the plan participant’s spouse as the contingent beneficiary.
This allows required minimum distributions to be based on the joint
life expectancy of the plan participant and a child (subject, of course,
to the MDIB requirement) rather than the shorter joint life expectancy of the participant and the spouse. If the participant predeceases
the spouse, the children would be expected to disclaim their interest
in the plan, allowing the surviving spouse to roll it over into an IRA
and name new designated beneficiaries, presumably the very same
children.
b. Continuing employment. To gain an extra decade or two of income tax deferral, plan participants may continue their employment,
perhaps through a part-time employment arrangement and thereby
postpone their RBD.

122. See generally, Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax Withholding: A Comparative Study and Analysis of the Issues, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 107 (1990); American Bar
Association, Report of the Second Invitational Conference on Income Tax Compliance, 42 TAX
LAW 705 (1989); American Bar Association, Report and Recommendation on Taxpayer Compliance, 41 TAX LAW 329 (1988).
123. For an illustration of the significance of the tax dollars that can be saved, see supra
Table I and accompanying text.
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c. Rolling over account balances. In certain instances, plan participants who have made poor beneficiary designation choices (e.g.,
naming their estate as the designated beneficiary) can rectify these
errors—albeit at an immediate tax cost—by rolling over their account balances into newly formed Roth IRAs that permit them to
name new designated beneficiaries.
B. Equity of the Minimum Distribution Rules
Aside from administrative difficulties, the minimum distribution
rules exacerbate a weakness that is already part of our system of taxfavored retirement saving: the tax benefits are skewed toward highincome individuals. The tax-favored treatment of qualified plans
costs the Treasury billions of dollars annually and constitutes the single largest tax expenditure of the federal budget.124 Despite these
costs, study after study indicates that those who capitalize most on
the advantages of tax deferral are the highly compensated.125 The
minimum distribution rules perpetuate this inequity by allowing the
account balances of the highly compensated to grow virtually unabated over a significant time period, far beyond the lifetime of the
plan participant.
During retirement, wealthy plan participants are more likely to
be able to draw upon financial resources other than their qualified
plans, thus prolonging plan distributions and resultant income taxes
for many years. Their designated beneficiaries (children, grandchildren, or great-grandchildren) are likewise apt to have alternative financial resources other than qualified plan assets and could afford to
prolong plan distributions as long as possible. In contrast, plan participants who are less financially fortunate often tap their qualified

124. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-13-99, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2000-2004, at 23 (1999) (for fiscal year 2000, the tax expenditure for the net exclusion for pension contributions and earnings is estimated to be $93.2
billion).
125. See David E. Bloom & Richard B. Freeman, The Fall in Private Plan Coverage in the
United States, 82 AMER. ECON. REV. 539 (1992) (showing how less educated males experienced particularly severe declines in pension coverage in the 1980s); Craig J. Langstraat, The
Individual Retirement Account: Retirement Help for the Masses, or Another Tax Break for the
Wealthy?, 60 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 437 (1986) (arguing that IRA provisions favor wealthy taxpayers); Bruce A. Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions
Confront Economic Realty, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 430-31 (1984) (“[L]ow paid employees . . .
may be less willing to save than others because of pressing current consumption needs.”).
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plans sooner and commonly exhaust plan assets well before their
death.126
Consider the example in Table I, supra Section III.A. By the
time Child inherits the IRA, there is already $1.7 million accumulated outside the IRA, making it more likely that Child can afford to
take out only the minimum required distribution each year. Now
suppose that Spouse’s designated beneficiary had not been Child,
but instead Grandchild, age two in Year 19. The joint and last survivor life expectancy of Spouse and Grandchild is 76.6 years, which allows distributions to be spread out over nearly ninety-three years
from Owner’s RBD.127
There seems little justification for a system that, on one hand, allows the highly compensated to amass significant tax-favored wealth
on the theory that it was needed for retirement but, on the other
hand, permits them to perpetuate their own financial dynasties as this
wealth moves across multiple generations, retaining its tax-favored
status.128
V. PROPOSALS TO RENDER THE MINIMUM DISTRIBUTION RULES
MORE EFFECTIVE
This analysis sets forth two alternative proposals, each of which is
based upon the following simple proposition: the benefits of tax deferral should inure solely to plan participants (and their spouses). The
notion that such benefits should inure primarily to participants and
spouses is already well embedded in the MDIB requirement and
minimum distribution rule legislative history.129 But unless one be126. See Angela E. Chang, Tax Policy, Lump-Sum Pension Distributions, and Household
Savings, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 235 (1996) (presenting empirical evidence that those with low incomes are less likely to roll over qualified plan distributions than are the highly compensated).
127. The minimum distribution rules are inequitable from another perspective. They
cause otherwise similarly situated plan participants to bear different tax burdens. This inequity
is due to such factors as the governing terms found in qualified plan documents that limit distribution modes and marital circumstances that necessitate the use of marital trusts, both of
which can curtail deferral opportunities.
128. See John A. Herbers, Leveraging an IRA’s Tax Deferral Into Multi-Generational
Wealth, TR. & EST., Jan. 1997, at 10.
129. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM OF 1986, at 710.
Uniform minimum distribution rules which establish the permissible periods over
which benefits from any tax-favored retirement arrangement may be distributed ensure that plans are used to fulfill the purpose that justifies their tax-favored status—
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lieves that all saving should be tax-favored (which would essentially
transform our income tax system into a consumption tax system),
there seems little justification for extending the tax benefits to other
beneficiaries.
These proposals, therefore, aim at protecting plan participants’
(and their spouses’) standard of living during their retirement years
while simultaneously curtailing the ability of their beneficiaries to
gain unwarranted tax benefits. Both proposals also aim to make the
minimum distribution rules simpler and more equitable.130
A. Proposal One: Modify the Existing Minimum Distribution Rules
1. A joint life expectancy should be used only if the designated
beneficiary is a spouse
Under this proposal, required minimum distributions would
generally be based only on the life expectancy of the plan participant.
The only exception to this rule would be if the plan participant’s
spouse were the designated beneficiary, in which event minimum distributions would be based on the joint and survivor life expectancy
of the plan participant and the spouse.131
2. In the case of defined contribution plans and IRAs, life expectancies
must be recalculated
When determining their minimum distribution amounts, plan
participants (and their spouses) would have to use the recalculation
method rather than the term certain method. This means that the
minimum distribution for a year is determined simply by dividing the

replacement of a participant’s preretirement income stream at retirement—rather
than for the indefinite deferral of tax on a participant’s accumulation under the plan.
Id.
130. Adoption of either of these proposals would have the immediate effect of significantly increasing the number of taxable lump sum distributions. In recognition of this fact and
to make these proposals more politically palatable, this analysis advocates returning to a system
of income averaging for such lump sum distributions.
131. The complex MDIB requirements (and their 10 single-spaced pages in the regulations) would no longer be necessary, since they only apply when the life expectancy of a nonspousal designated beneficiary is used. Note that participants could name anyone as the actual
beneficiary of the plan, but, unless the designated beneficiary were a spouse, minimum distributions could only be made over the life of the plan participant. Thus, plans would not be
permitted to pay survivor annuities to anyone other than a spouse.
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account balance by the current life expectancy of the plan participant
(or the participant and a spouse). The relevant life expectancies are
already set forth in Treasury Regulation tables.132 The only information needed to use the table is the attained age of the plan participant (and the spouse, if the spouse is the designated beneficiary).
Determining a new life expectancy each year guarantees that the
minimum distribution requirement will not force the plan account to
be liquidated prior to the death of the plan participant and the
spouse.133
3. Plan administrators would be responsible for distributing minimum
distribution amounts
This proposal would make plan administrators responsible for
annually distributing minimum distribution amounts from all plans
(including traditional IRAs and Roth IRAs).134 In satisfying the
minimum distribution requirement, IRA owners could no longer
pick and choose between and among their IRAs.135 To enforce compliance, plan administrators would be liable for an excise tax (equal,
for example, to 20% of what they fail to distribute) for any failure to
comply with this distribution mandate.
As more and more retirement savings find their way into IRAs
via rollovers, the need to make IRA custodians responsible for making minimum distributions has become more urgent. Strong policy
grounds support the change. First, plan administrators likely have
better resources to monitor compliance with the minimum distribu132. See Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9, Tables V (one life) & VI (two lives) (1999).
133. It also means that at the death of one spouse minimum distributions will be increased since they will be based solely on the life of the survivor.
134. Currently, only administrators of employer-provided plans have responsibility for
ensuring that the plans they administer distribute the minimum distribution amounts to plan
participants. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9). A plan that fails to meet the minimum distribution requirements would be disqualified, although the regulations provide that the disqualification
sanction will not be imposed for isolated failures. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, A-5,
52 Fed. Reg. 28,070, 28,099 (1987). In contrast, with respect to traditional IRAs and Roth
IRAs, the responsibility for withdrawing the minimum distribution amounts rests with the plan
participants themselves. An IRA that fails to make minimum distributions would cease to be
tax-exempt, see I.R.C. § 408(a)(6), but since each IRA is a separate plan, it is only the plan
participant who is affected.
135. Although the required minimum distribution must currently be calculated separately
for each IRA, see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.408-8, A-1, 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,102, the Treasury Department permits these amounts to be totaled and the resulting total amount taken from any
one or more of the plan participant’s IRAs. See Notice 88-38, 1988-1 C.B. 524.
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tion rules and can do so more efficiently. Second, plan participants
are usually not well-versed on the complex minimum distribution requirements and are therefore prone to commit computational errors.
Third, the introduction of an excise tax on plan administrators,
rather than plan participants, would encourage compliance by those
in the best position to do so.136 Finally, by monitoring the centralized efforts of plan administrators rather than the decentralized efforts of plan participants, the Service will be in a better position to
police minimum distribution rule compliance.
4. Accounts must be distributed within the year following the
participant’s (and spouse’s) death
Upon the death of plan participants (and their spouses), qualified
plan assets (including those held in Roth IRAs) would have to be
distributed by December 31 of the year following the date of death.
Except in the case of Roth IRAs or nondeductible contributions, any
amounts distributed would immediately be subject to income tax.
The logic of this requirement is straightforward. The reason for
the special, highly favorable tax treatment of qualified plans is to create an incentive to provide for one’s retirement. When the participant and the participant’s spouse are dead, there is no further justification for costly tax incentives.137

136. This proposed change raises a potential problem regarding plan participants who,
during the course of a year, roll over their retirement accounts into new retirement accounts
with a different plan administrator. In the case of a direct rollover from one plan to another,
the plan administrator of the transferring plan, prior to the transfer, would have the responsibility to distribute the minimum distribution amount to the plan participant. If the plan participant receives a distribution directly, the plan would provide a form specifying how much
could be rolled over and how much was a minimum distribution that could not be rolled over.
The plan administrator of the recipient plan would accept a rollover only if accompanied by the
form. The recipient plan would, of course, be required to make a minimum distribution with
respect to the rolled over amounts in the following year, based on their value as of December
31 of the year of the rollover.
137. Note that paying the tax presents little difficulty to the beneficiaries. Plan accounts
are highly liquid, consisting overwhelmingly of stocks, bonds, bank accounts, and mutual fund
shares. (Some qualified plans, particularly plans of large employers, will invest in less liquid assets, such as real estate, but the plan administrators have a fiduciary duty to make sure that the
plan has sufficient liquidity to meet the need for distributions to beneficiaries.) The taxes generated by the distribution will simply be paid out of the distribution itself. The heirs may complain about the “outrageous” amounts the government takes, but this complaint is no different
from those made by anyone else who receives a lot of income and has to pay tax on it. Also, it
should be remembered that the funds in the account should really have been taxed long ago,
but, in effect, the government has made an interest-free loan to the participant in the amount
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5. Limited income averaging for post-death distributions would be
available
Under a progressive income tax regime, income bunching occurs
when the receipt of income earned over several years is received in
one taxable year. In some cases, income may be exposed to a higher
marginal tax bracket than it otherwise would have been had it been
received in smaller increments over longer periods of time. Although
marginal tax rates are much lower today than in decades past, we are
nowhere near a flat tax regime, and income bunching can cause increased taxes, albeit in a much more modest fashion than in prior
years. Since the beneficiaries of a deceased participant will be compelled to withdraw the participant’s account over a short time period
(i.e., by the year following the death of the plan participant or his or
her spouse), the distribution may be subject to an abnormally high
tax bracket due to this bunching.
To minimize potential inequity and defuse a possible critique of
this proposal, income averaging should be made available to the
beneficiaries of a deceased participant’s account. Now repealed, tenyear averaging, later reduced to five-year averaging, was generally
available for any lump sum distribution at one time.138 It would
therefore not be difficult to restore either five- or ten-year averaging
for post-death distributions. Five-year averaging seems the most reasonable option, but even ten-year averaging would be a small price
to pay for establishing the principle that tax deferral must end after
the participant’s (or spouse’s) death.
6. Reporting requirements would be increased
To enable the Service to enforce the minimum distribution rules
effectively, plan administrators would be required to submit information returns to the Service notifying the Service of the commenceof the tax that should have been paid. At some point, it is appropriate to repay that loan. What
better time than after the participant’s (or spouse’s) death? From a moral perspective, any claim
by the beneficiaries for a continuation of the tax subsidy is fairly weak. They, unlike the participant, have done nothing to earn these funds; they simply had the luck to be born to parents
who could accumulate wealth. Why should others pay higher taxes so that these lucky ones can
have a larger windfall? It also bears repeating that the benefits of tax-favored retirement saving
are already skewed to high-income earners.
138. See I.R.C. § 402(d)(4)(A). Congress repealed the five-year averaging rules for lumpsum distributions made after Dec. 31, 1999. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1401, 110 Stat. 1755 (1996).
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ment of minimum distributions and specifying the birthdates of the
participant (and the participant’s spouse, if the spouse is the designated beneficiary). In addition, the executor (or estate administrator)
of a plan participant’s estate would have an affirmative duty to notify
the plan administrator of the plan participant’s death (and/or the
death of the plan participant’s spouse, if named as the designated
beneficiary).
7. Roth IRAs would be subject to the same minimum distribution rules
as traditional IRAs
Currently, the minimum distribution rules do not apply to Roth
IRAs until the death of the plan participant.139 The purpose of the
tax subsidy for qualified plans and IRAs is to encourage saving for
retirement so that participants and their spouses can maintain their
standard of living, not to encourage the creation of wealth for their
heirs. Roth IRAs should not enjoy special tax status. Starting at the
plan participant’s RBD, distributions from Roth IRAs should commence. The minimum distribution rules should apply in a universal
fashion to all tax-favored retirement saving.
B. Proposal Two: Eliminate the Existing Minimum Distribution Rules
and Replace Them with a Date of Death Distribution Mandate
Some politicians may find the first proposal distasteful because in
many cases it will accelerate the receipt of qualified plan distributions
during the lives of the plan participants (and their spouses) and does
not afford any tax deferral following their deaths. Their perception
may be that this proposal, despite its inherent equity, amounts to a
hidden tax increase, and, for that reason alone, they would not support it.
We, therefore, offer a second proposal in response to those who
might harbor such political misgivings. Under this proposal, no distributions would have to be made during the life of plan participants
(or their spouses). However, as in the first proposal, upon the death
of the plan participant (and his or her spouse), all the assets held in
the qualified plan would have to be distributed by December 31 of

139. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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the year following such death. Income averaging would be available
as in the first proposal.140
This simple system has numerous virtues. First, plan participants
(and their spouses) can easily comprehend this rule. Second, there
are virtually no compliance issues during the lives of participants (and
their spouses), relieving plan administrators and the Service of much
of their respective oversight responsibilities. Enforcement of the
minimum distribution rules would occur only once, when the participant and spouse have died. The structure of this minimum distribution system, too, would continue to encourage savings over consumption during the lives of the participant and spouse.
But the virtues of this simple rule come at a steeper price than
that associated with the first proposal. More specifically, funds that
the minimum distribution rules currently force out during the lives
of plan participants (and their spouses) would be permitted to accumulate tax free until their deaths. Initially, this represents a temporary increase in the current tax expenditure for qualified plans.141
Moreover, because the wealthy are most able to capitalize upon the
use of qualified plans,142 the additional tax subsidy would most likely
accrue disproportionately in their favor.
Despite its added cost, the second proposal is still an improvement over the present system. Exchanging the allowance of lifetime
accumulation for the elimination of post-death deferrals amounts to
a significant reduction in the tax expenditure in the long run. This is
due to the fact that under the present rules when children or grandchildren are named designated beneficiaries the permitted deferral
period after the death of the plan participant is typically much longer
than the period between the participant’s RBD and the participant’s
death. For example, in Table I, there are twenty years between the
RBD and death of the last to die of Owner and Spouse, but an additional twenty-four years of deferral to Child. Had the designated
140. See David A. Pratt & Dianne Bennett, Simplifying Retirement Plan Distributions, 57
N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX ¶ 5.06[1][b] (“Any benefits remaining at the death of the owner
or surviving spouse must be distributed, in full, by the due date for filing the federal estate tax
return, regardless of whether a return is actually required.”).
141. The tax deferral incentive of this proposal would probably lead plan participants to
hold their retirement assets in qualified plan solution longer. Because assets held at the death
of plan participants are includible in the plan participant’s estate, see I.R.C. § 2039(a), the revenue cost of instituting this proposal may be less then anticipated due to the likely increase in
estate tax revenue generated.
142. See supra Section IV.B.
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beneficiary named by Spouse been Grandchild (or Greatgrandchild), age two when Owner died, the deferral could have produced an additional seventy-one years of deferral!
C. Transition Rules
As with any proposed change in the tax laws, the issue arises as to
whether there should be some transition rules to cushion the effect
of the change. In connection with either proposal, the case for a
transition rule is extremely weak. The major change in both proposals that is detrimental to taxpayers is the loss of tax deferral after the
death of the participant and the participant’s spouse. Thus, a huge
part of the tax subsidy is retained. Moreover, the proposals can be
viewed as a refinement, hardly unprecedented, of the longestablished concept that nonretirement benefits (e.g., benefits to
heirs) are supposed to be “incidental” to pension plans. It is extremely relevant that when Congress first imposed the minimum distribution requirements on all plans, it saw no need to provide a transitional rule, other than deferring the effective date a few years for
governmental and collectively bargained plans.143 Just as there may
have been many at that time who had planned to accumulate their
retirement benefits well after age seventy, today there may be many
who had planned on their heirs accumulating benefits well after their
death. Neither expectation is particularly worthy of protection.
D. Benefits Associated with the Adoption of Either of These Proposals
Consider the effects were Congress to adopt either of these proposals.144 No longer would the minimum distribution rules be a
source of plan participant confusion and malaise. Armed with a sensible set of rules that they could comprehend, brokerage houses, tax
planners, and the Service would benefit as well. Finally, under either
proposal, although certainly more so under the first, unnecessary and
inequitable tax subsidies would be reduced.

143. See Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 521(d)(2)-(5), 98 Stat. 494,
868 (1984).
144. At least one commentator has suggested that the minimum distribution rules be
reformed or repealed. See Mark J. Warshawsky, Minimum Distribution Requirements: Reform
or Remove Them, 82 TAX NOTES 1133 (1998). He, however, offers few constructive suggestions to make the minimum distribution rules more administrable or equitable.

623

SOL-FIN.DOC

5/8/00 1:08 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2000

The simple truth is that tax-free compounding already provides
more than adequate incentive for taxpayers to participate in and contribute to qualified plans. Were either of these proposals adopted,
few, if any, plan participants would forfeit their participation in qualified plans or reduce their contributions. Under current law, the
benefits of tax-free compounding that serendipitously inure to designated beneficiaries (other than the plan participant’s surviving
spouse) are thus entirely unwarranted and unnecessary to spur qualified plan participation.
Yet, congressional passage of either of these proposals would not
necessarily be easy.145 The proposal to modify the existing minimum
distribution rules would likely face stiff opposition from plan participants who have large retirement benefits as well as from their beneficiaries who would lose a significant tax deferral advantage.146 Despite
this potential opposition, the shortcomings of the minimum distribution rules are too weighty to be ignored; they must be scrapped for
something better.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current minimum distribution rules threaten to turn the
pool of wealth held by qualified plans into a vast and burgeoning
ocean. Following the model set by Chinese officials in constructing
the Three Gorges Dam, Congress should properly harness the power
of this ocean of wealth. Adoption of either proposal set forth in Section V would establish effective floodgates for the retirement system,
ensuring that the tax-subsidized wealth housed in the sanctuary of
qualified plans is used primarily to meet the retirement needs of plan
participants (and their spouses) and not to create windfalls for their

145. Indeed, a new bill in Congress would exacerbate the dysfunctional nature of the
minimum distribution rules. The bill, entitled “Financial Freedom Act of 1999” proposes that
the minimum distribution rules be further relaxed; it would essentially eliminate the “at least as
rapidly rule” under I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(B)(i).
146. The proposal to replace the minimum distribution rule with a distribution at death
mandate would be scored as a revenue loser, even though in the long run it raises revenue.
(This is because the current revenue scoring system used in the budget process looks forward a
maximum of ten years.) Given the present budget surplus, the revenue scoring process might
actually work in favor of the second proposal since Congress could appear to be cutting taxes
when in fact in the long run it was raising them. This is the precise opposite of the scoring of
Roth IRAs, which in the short run increase revenue (since contributions are not deductible, as
is the case with traditional IRAs) but in the long run their utilization by taxpayers results in
tremendous revenue losses.
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heirs. Immense amounts of revenue would be generated while leaving intact more than sufficient incentives to save for retirement.
From an administrative and equity perspective, the outcome of this
harnessing process would be awe-inspiring, creating a structure as
magnificent as the Three Gorges Dam.
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